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Abstract 
 
 
There exist two equally prominent, though seemingly divergent metaphilosophical viewpoints. One takes 
philosophy to be an essentially revolutionary process. The other sees philosophy as a constructive, 
collaborative enterprise that seeks increased rigor and consensus. Recent debate in the philosophy of 
language regarding the relationship of particular languages to the general capacity for language reveals 
an illuminating structural analogy with these divergent metaphilosophical trends. While neither debate is 
settled herein, regardless of their eventual determinations, it is concluded that there is little reason to 
suppose that philosophy will some day become a science, at least not in any metaphilosophically 
meaningful sense of the phrase.  
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
There exist two equally prominent, though seemingly divergent metaphilosophical 
viewpoints. The one sees philosophy as essentially a revolutionary process whereby 
novel perspectives are sought after and prized according to the extent that they either 
undermine the assumed universality of pre-existing schools of thought, or at least do 
not unquestioningly rely on them to get off the ground, so to speak. This mode of 
philosophy is made and advocated for in the metaphilosophical prescriptions of many 
of the West’s great philosophers. The other seemingly dichotomous viewpoint takes 
philosophy to be a constructive, collaborative enterprise that seeks increased rigor and 
consensus. This particular metaphilosophical characterization is made manifest in the 
workaday practices, pedagogies, and rhetorical modes common to Western academic 
philosophy.  
 
The aim in the first third of this paper then, is both to establish that such apparently 
opposing metaphilosophical viewpoints do exist, and to thereby provide a rough
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articulation of their supposed natures. Although it is not within the purview of this 
article to establish whether the one, the other, or both simultaneously are accurate, 
Richard Rorty’s own brand of metaphilosophical dualism shall be invoked as providing 
a working definition by which to undertake the meta-metaphilosophical analysis herein.  
 
In the second third of the article, the goal is to rehearse a recent debate in the 
philosophy of language that shares a remarkable structural analogy to the 
metaphilosophical dualism outlined. The debate centers on the sense in which one must 
belong to a normatively grounded linguistic community in order for one to have any 
language whatsoever. Communitarians in the vein of Wittgenstein argue that bedrock 
propositions, such as ‘This is red’, are needed initially for the emergence of any full-
blown language capable of making finer, objective distinctions, such as ‘I mistakenly 
thought that this was maroon’. Interpersonalists of a Davidsonian bent, on the other 
hand, maintain that ‘interpretation goes all the way down’, such that the notion of 
bedrock propositions is deeply misleading and cannot possibly serve the function 
hoped. The purpose in rehearsing this debate, however, is not to resolve it. Instead, the 
aim is to explore the parallels between the debate and outlined metaphilosophical 
dualism so as to further explicate the nature of the latter.  
 
In light of the preceding undertaking, it shall be concluded in the third and final part, 
that regardless of how either debate may eventually come to be resolved, we have little 
reason to suppose that philosophy will become a science in any metaphilosophically 
meaningful sense of the phrase. 
 
 
1. Meta-Metaphilosophy 
 
The claim that philosophy harbors contrary tendencies is not without precedent (though 
technically it is not the claim that is being made herein). Friedrich Nietzsche, for 
instance, proclaims (1968, p. 509): 
 
After having tried in vain for a long time to attach a definite concept to the word 
“philosopher” – for I found many contradictory characteristics – I recognized at 
last that there are two distinct kinds of philosopher:  
 
1. those who want to ascertain a complex fact of evaluations (logical or moral);  
2. those who are legislators of such evaluations. 
 
In more recent times and with greater elucidation, Richard Rorty draws a similar 
distinction between what he called revolutionary and normal philosophy. Of 
revolutionary philosophers, they are said to create new vocabularies incommensurable 
with those of their institutionalized predecessors. In this category then, Rorty would 
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place the likes of all the great philosophers (e.g. Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy 
Bentham, etc.) insofar as they founded new schools of philosophy (i.e. Virtue Ethics, 
Kantianism, and Utilitarianism, respectively). Normal philosophy, on the other hand, is 
then to be understood as the workaday, institutionalized practice of professional 
philosophers, especially insofar as they subscribe to the schools made paradigmatic by 
their revolutionary counterparts. Undoubtedly the majority of normal philosophers will 
be unknown soldiers, as it were. Yet its poster-boys (and girls) would presumably 
include the likes of Peter Singer, Ernest Nagel, Philippa Foot, etc., in that each has 
made significant contributions to their respective schools of thought without thereby 
occasioning a Copernican shift. 
 
For our present purposes, it will suffice to employ Rorty’s metaphilosophical dualism 
as providing working definitions for what we have called the constructive and 
revolutionary modes of philosophy.1 Although it would go far beyond the scope of this 
paper to attempt to endorse or refute either metaphilosophical dualism or its component 
parts, in the following two sections at least, the prevalence of each independent 
metaphilosophical viewpoint will be established in turn. The aim here is firstly, to offer 
some limited evidence that both metaphilosophical positions are common and 
widespread, and secondly, to further articulate what each standpoint amounts to, such 
that the success (or failing) of the analogical work in the second third of this paper will 
be made more determinate. The following two sections then, are meta-
metaphilosophical in nature, and will outline in turn the characterizations of philosophy 
both as a revolutionary process and as a constructive enterprise. 
 
 
1.1 Philosophy as a Revolutionary Process 
 
If one looks to the canonical writings of philosophy, it is apparent that there is a 
common tendency to characterize philosophy as an essentially revolutionary process. It 
is the goal of this section to establish this as commonplace, and so we shall move rather 
quickly from one metaphilosophy to the next, relying on rather implicit and sweeping 
interpretations of the many quoted passages. Of course this is not ideal, but the slower, 
more careful treatment that each work undoubtedly deserves shall have to wait for 
another time.2 
 
It hardly needs mentioning that it was René Descartes – the commonly recognized 
father of modern philosophy – who most directly set the tenor for philosophy 
considered as a revolutionary process. Read by most every student of philosophy, his 
much-celebrated (and so, equally lamented) Meditations on First Philosophy famously 
opens (1996, p. 17): 
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Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had 
accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the 
whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. I realized that it was 
necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and 
start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all … 
that was stable and likely to last. 
 
According to this conception of philosophy as a revolutionary process, the point is not 
simply to seek the ruin of collaborative, constructive enterprises for the sake of 
destruction. Rather, as the term revolution implies, the revolutionary philosopher seeks 
only to criticize and undermine pre-existing schools of thought for the sake of gaining 
new and better perspectives by which to comprehend the truth.  
 
As was indicated earlier, Nietzsche’s own metaphilosophical vantage is admittedly 
dualistic. However, like Descartes, he endorses only the revolutionary strain, as can be 
better appreciated from the following elaboration on the earlier quoted aphorism (1968, 
§409, p. 220): ‘What dawns on philosophers last of all: they must no longer accept 
concepts as gifts, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make them, present them 
and make them convincing.’3 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari take Nietzsche’s 
metaphilosophy to its logical conclusion in suggesting that revolutionary philosophies 
are essentially incommensurable with other schools of thought. As they illustrate it 
(1994, p. 32): ‘The fact that Kant “criticizes” Descartes means only that he sets up a 
plane and constructs a problem that could not be occupied or completed by the 
Cartesian cogito ... This is the creation of a new concept.’4 And of course, as with most 
aspects of Nietzsche’s work, seeds of inspiration can be readily found in the writings of 
his predecessor and early ‘teacher’, Arthur Schopenhauer. For instance, there is a clear 
parallel to be seen when Schopenhauer writes on genius (1948, p. 239): 
 
We may … accurately define [genius] as the way of viewing things independent 
of the principle of sufficient reason, in opposition to the way of viewing them 
which proceeds in accordance with that principle, and which is the method of 
experience and of science. This last method of considering things may be 
compared to a line infinitely extended in a horizontal direction, and the former 
to a vertical line which cuts it at any point.  
 
This passage and the simile it employs nicely illustrate the supposed distinction 
between the constructive and the revolutionary approaches to philosophy. On the 
constructive model, a philosopher’s work is to add to the edifice according to the rules 
and methods of their school of thinking. According to the revolutionary understanding, 
an edifice may at any point in its construction be radically re-imagined without recourse 
to the old, pre-established methods or assumptions. 
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Similarly, Nietzsche’s own successor, Martin Heidegger, also shared in commending 
something like the revolutionary approach. In writing about thinking (as opposed to, 
say, calculating), Heidegger offers the following metaphilosophical claim: 
‘[Philosophers] are called thinkers precisely because thinking properly takes place in 
philosophy’ (1968, p. 5). He qualifies this by contrasting true philosophical thinking, 
which is original and free, from a ‘…preoccupation with [schools of] philosophy 
[which] more than anything else may give us the stubborn illusion that we are 
thinking…’ (ibid.). For Heidegger, true philosophical thought avoids the well-worn ruts 
that have in the scientific disciplines proven themselves so successful and so been much 
celebrated. He certainly does not dismiss the efficacy of these ready to hand 
approaches, but warns that, just as they may be instantiated in the unthinking circuitry 
boards of computers, it is essential to the continuation of our Being as distinct from 
unthinking machinery that we should keep alive true thinking that knows no 
predetermined path or destination (see Heidegger, 1977, esp. pp. 29–35). Again, a 
similar such metaphilosophy is expressed by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s own 
pupil, when he writes that true dialogue (of the variety extolled in the elenchus) is 
always open and undetermined (2004, p. 360): 
 
As the art of asking questions, dialectic proves its value because only the person 
who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which 
involves being able to preserve his orientation towards openness. The art of 
questioning is the art of questioning even further – i.e. the art of thinking. It is 
called dialectic because it is the art of conducting a real dialogue. 
 
For metaphilosophers such as these then, true philosophy is revolutionary for it aspires 
to the open freedom of originality engendered by what Nietzsche called legislation, 
Schopenhauer genius, Heidegger thinking, and Gadamer dialectic. What unites these 
four conceptions of revolutionary philosophy is that its practitioners are loath to rest 
contented merely puzzle-solving by filling in the blanks that have been circumscribed 
by some prevailing school of thought. 
 
 
1.2 Philosophy as a Constructive Enterprise 
 
While the explicit metaphilosophical claims of many of the great philosophers may 
espouse a revolutionary tendency, the contrary view is equally prevalent. But unlike the 
metaphilosophical mode canvassed in the previous section, we need not plumb the 
canonical writings in order to establish that philosophy is commonly taken to be a 
collaborative, constructive enterprise. It is plainly obvious in the practices, pedagogy 
and standard rhetorical mode of the discipline. Academic philosophy is geared around 
promoting ideals of developing sound and logical arguments, seeking clarity of ideas 
and expression, establishing cultural and contextual awareness, providing clear 
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referencing and citations, etc., etc. Professional philosophers are forever generating 
constructive criticism of the work of their peers in the hope of advancing debate and, 
with it, our collective understanding of the matters at hand. Indeed, that the work of a 
philosopher aspires to truth, accuracy, and with it, a convergence of consensus is 
inherent in the commonplace rhetorical mode employed by the discipline’s discourse. 
Unlike, say, literature, the very nature of philosophical writing is to present itself as 
speaking (to) the truth and so as inviting agreement.5  
 
And yet, if there is a substantive difference between the constructive or revolutionary 
philosophical modes, then there must be more to constructive philosophy than just this, 
for surely philosophers’ efforts in aspiring to truth and so with it, general consensus, 
typically apply just as readily to philosophy as a revolutionary process. The relevant 
difference can, however, be teased out by considering a commonplace off-shoot of the 
constructivist view, which credits philosophy with having given rise to various other 
disciplines throughout its long history (see, for instance, Kuhn 1996, p. 92)6. On this 
approach, one might be tempted (though perhaps not well-advised) to joke with a 
computer programmer that were it not for Aristotle, they’d be out of a job. In this light, 
the relevant difference between constructive and revolutionary philosophy would then 
seem to be that constructive philosophy is defined specifically by its continuation and 
normalization of a particular school of thought, such that it may eventually attain to 
such a degree of rigor and general consensus that it becomes a field of inquiry in its 
own right.  
 
It is curious that some regard this historical tendency of philosophy to engender 
independent and often highly productive disciplines as somehow a poor reflection on 
Philosophy herself (see, for instance, Picard 2007, p. 6)7. As I understand it, this 
censure must arise from either of two further metaphilosophical commitments: one that 
sees philosophy as having its own unique subject matter, and the other that doesn’t – 
rather only a methodology unique to the discipline.8 However, neither position 
coherently warrants the deprecation of philosophy. If one holds that philosophy has its 
own unique questions and areas of concern (see for instance, Berlin, 1999, p. 9),9 then 
the historical tendency of philosophy to give rise to disciplines in their own right should 
be viewed as a distinct kind of philosophical progress. This is because, according to 
such a perspective, one of the central roles of philosophy would be to sort the grain 
from the chaff, as it were, and so cast off all non-philosophical issues to their 
appropriate fields of inquiry. Philosophy having spawned independent disciplines 
would then be a sign of progress. As it stands, however, I do not believe that 
philosophers see themselves as involved in such an enterprise. When philosophers work 
to advance the arguments and methods for better understanding an issue, they do so, not 
in the hope that upon reaching a certain threshold of rigor and agreement they will 
finally be able to recognize that their efforts had only been incidentally philosophical 
insofar as by passing the threshold reveals that the problem was, for instance, scientific 
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after all and not philosophical. Philosophers strive for rigor and consensus because they 
want to better understand the matters that they are dealing with – ultimately it is beside 
the point whether the investigation is conducted in the faculty of Arts or of Science. So 
even if it turns out that philosophy inherently has its own unique questions and 
concerns, the fact it has given birth to other disciplines is no real failing of philosophy. 
And neither is it a straightforward indictment against philosophy proper that it has not 
made the same kind of progress as its various off-shoots, for who’s to say that its 
comparative sluggishness isn’t simply a result of the overly complicated and difficult 
subject matter distinctive to it. To think otherwise would be akin to naively comparing 
the ground covered by a long-distance runner with that of a mountaineer.  
 
The other alternative then, is that philosophy does not possess unique questions and 
concerns of it own, and instead has failed because it is unable to adequately respond by 
employing its own unique methodologies to so many of the questions over which it 
once held court – thus losing legitimate claim in investigating certain questions as other 
methods proved more successful (see, for instance, Armstrong, 1980, p. 3)10. And yet, 
while it may well be humbling to realize that other methodologies are better suited to 
areas that once belonged within philosophy’s dominion, I think it is a 
mischaracterization to think that this in anyway detracts from the legitimacy or worth of 
current philosophical work or progress. Instead, I should like to recommend a 
decidedly Kuhnian approach in suggesting that the numerous individual schools of 
philosophy do indeed make progress comparable to that of the sciences (see Kuhn, 
1996, esp. pp. 162–3)11. It’s just that, because the very existence of each philosophical 
school thereby calls into doubt the foundations of the other, then, unlike the 
professional insularity of the various scientific areas of specialization (see Kuhn, 1996, 
p. 164), the voice of progress in any one school of philosophy is lost among the 
cacophonous choir that is philosophy as a whole. On this view, it is rather to the credit 
of philosophy that historically it has been nursemaid to so many of the various 
academic disciplines, for it indicates not only that philosophers have managed to make 
progress in the school-specific sense, but have done so to the extent that they’ve 
occasionally met the conditions sufficient for a transition to the scientific mode of 
progress. And nor should we feel bad that many of the remaining areas of inquiry that 
philosophy still concerns itself with have not yet brought to fruition their own 
individual disciplines, for constructive, collaborative progress is still being made, 
though just not (yet) of the same variety as scientific progress. 
 
 
2. Philosophy and Language 
 
As we have seen, the two metaphilosophical viewpoints – revolutionary and 
constructive – are at the same time equally prevalent and seemingly antithetical. 
Philosophy considered as a constructive, collaborative enterprise seeks increased rigor 
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and consensus, either so as to raise the level of inquiry to the point where it will 
become an independent school of thought of its own (scientific or otherwise), or 
alternatively to better understand the nature of a matter by means and methods uniquely 
philosophical. The metaphilosophical understanding of philosophy as a revolutionary 
process – so highly extolled in the annals of the discipline’s greats – counsels the 
contrary. According to this view, the true work of the philosopher is to think for herself, 
not merely problem-solving by filling in the blanks dictated by a pre-existing school of 
thought, but to radically re-envisage the conceptual landscape so as to create an original 
school in its own right. In the following sections, a recent debate in the philosophy of 
language shall be rehearsed (though not adjudicated), for, as we shall see, it shares a 
striking and remarkable parallel to the metaphilosophical dualism canvassed thus far.  
 
 
2.1 Language and Languages 
 
When we think about language, we typically think of particular languages, such as 
English, Japanese, or Gaelic. This tendency is liable to lead us to suppose that for 
language in general to be possible, one must be a speaker of some particular language. 
Despite this seemingly reasonable presumption, Donald Davidson claimed contrariwise 
that he knew of no argument that two speakers must share the same particular language 
in order for them to be able to communicate with one another (2001a, p. 14). Rather, 
Davidson reasoned that so long as interlocutors intentionally behave (e.g. speak) so as 
to be interpretable with respect to their individual perceptions and beliefs about a 
shared environment, then there is no need for recourse to any particular language in 
accounting for the possibility of language (ibid, pp. 114–17). Indeed, Davidson even 
goes so far as to argue that languages qua language do not strictly exist (2005, pp. 89–
109) – meaning that, while individuals certainly approximate the normative 
conventions of a particular language, there is and can be no absolutely standard form of 
any given language, for it is impossible to conceive of an absolutely fixed convention 
marker (e.g. ‘By ‘x’, I mean, x’) that can resist being reinterpreted (for instance, by an 
actor calling out, ‘The theatre is on fire and this is not part of the play’, all as part of the 
play) (2001b, pp. 265–281). 
 
Communitarians, on the other hand, wish to stress the need for shared and so, 
normatively governed bedrock propositions, such as are made by saying, for instance, 
‘This color is called “red”’, when pointing at a patch of color that English speakers 
would typically refer to as ‘red’ (see Williams, 2000). They argue that without such 
primitively shared conventions that the initiate must take for granted, there can be no 
possibility of the further, more nuanced interpretations requisite for full-blown 
language. That is to say, the meaning of a word is given by the role that it plays in the 
language holistically; the communitarian emphasizes that one must first establish a 
shared framework of interrelated word meanings (e.g. ‘red’, ‘blue’, ‘yellow’), in order 
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for more nuanced concepts to be possible (e.g. ‘purple’, ‘green’, ‘mauve’, ‘puce’, 
‘aquamarine’, etc.). 
 
To tease out exactly what is at stake here, let us dwell on the matter a moment longer 
by first considering Barry Stroud’s summary of the issue from a communitarian 
perspective (2003, p. 692)12. Stroud asks: 
 
What determines what [an] expression means? It can be nothing other than the 
way the expression is actually used, or is to be used. In the most familiar 
ostensive learning situation, where the pupil is learning the language of her 
community, she will use the word correctly, and will have understood its 
meaning, only if she uses it as it is used in that community… That there is a 
certain social linguistic practice, and that a particular expression has a certain 
role or use in that practice, is therefore essential to that expression’s having any 
meaning at all. 
 
The emphasis at point here is as to whether the pupil uses a particular word in 
accordance with the norms of the linguistic community to which that word belongs. 
This communitarian point is further hammered home by Meredith Williams (2000, p. 
20):  
 
Training is the medium in which … common behavior, that is, our differential 
responses to the aspects of the environment, is exploited in teaching judgments 
of sameness. Learning such responses is a matter of calibration. …Two kinds of 
natural reaction are involved: our innate perceptual sensitivities and behavioral 
reactions to certain stimuli; and our common reaction to training. Both are 
necessary conditions for becoming participants within language games.  
 
The initiate’s natural tendency to imitate allows one to inculcate basic bedrock 
propositions in response to the most primitively shared experiences of the environment. 
Once the meaning of these bedrock propositions has been fixed by training, subtler 
distinctions can then be drawn and developed. That is to say, because ‘judgments of 
sameness must be rigid to serve [their] purpose in measuring understanding and 
enabling us to engage in more sophisticated [language] games where matters are far 
from obvious,’ (ibid) certain words and propositions (i.e. trained behavioral responses) 
must therefore be commonly shared and their meaning fixed. More straightforwardly: 
to have language generally, one must be a speaker of some particular language. 
 
Interpersonalists do not deny that the communitarian’s account captures something 
important about the typical process by which one comes to be a language-user; after all, 
every known language-user seemingly has one or more particular languages. However, 
interpersonalists argue that strictly speaking, no particular language is in fact required, 
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and to think otherwise leads one to make statements and to draw conclusions that are 
misleading. As Davidson criticized Stroud’s communitarian bent (2003, p. 673): 
 
When [Stroud] talks, for example, of ‘the role [an expression] plays in the 
language as a whole’, I am not sure whether he is just emphasizing the 
legitimate point that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has 
meaning (as both Frege, and Wittgenstein after him, insisted), or whether he is 
also assuming that an expression has a role assigned to it by a linguistic society 
that in this respect just like a Platonic meaning is waiting there for the learner to 
grasp. 
  
Clearly Davidson takes the latter assumption to be mistaken. The point Davidson 
wishes to make isn’t that the words taught by ostensive learning are utterly meaningless 
to the student. Rather, it’s that whatever meaning the teacher and the linguistic 
community at large may attach to that word (as part of the holistic network of their 
other beliefs) can in no way be directly transmitted to the student. As Davidson 
elaborates in an earlier paper (2001c, pp. 14–15, emphasis added): ‘The question what 
others besides the learner, even his teacher, mean by [a] sound is irrelevant … and we 
will misinterpret the learner if we assume that for him it has any meaning not connected 
with that process [of ostensive learning].’ This is a point that Claudine Verheggen also 
takes up and elaborates in response to Williams’ communitarianism. She writes of this 
central tenant of interpersonalism (2006, p. 214): 
 
This is not to deny … it is likely that the child will end up meaning by her 
words what her teachers mean by them. Nor is it to deny that the first language 
learning process, in addition to the necessary sharing of beliefs, gives us all the 
more reason to think that people’s languages overlap a lot. But, again, there is 
no saying in advance which particular meanings will be shared because no 
particular ones must be… Ultimately, the important part of the learning process 
lies not in the particular ways in which the child draws the distinction between 
correct and incorrect applications of her words but in her acquiring the very idea 
of the distinction. 
 
According to the interpersonalist, although we are typically correct in assuming that the 
process of ostensive learning will attach similar meanings to the introduced words and 
bedrock propositions for use in developing further, more sophisticated distinctions, they 
stress that it is not until the capacity for understanding that distinctions can be at all 
made that one can begin to investigate the extent to which the initial meaning that the 
student held via the process of ostension correlates either to that of the linguistic 
community generally or to any individual of that community in particular. 
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2.2 Drawing the Analogy 
 
Here is not the place to weigh in on the debate of how we are to best understand and 
describe the relationship between language and languages. For our present purpose it 
will suffice to highlight the parallels shared with the two metaphilosophical 
perspectives outlined in the first third of this paper. To put it plainly: communitarianism 
shares similarities to philosophy considered as a constructive enterprise, as 
interpersonalism does to philosophy as a revolutionary process. Just as the 
communitarian stresses the need for normative rigidity in linguistic behavior so as to 
calibrate the meaning of certain bedrock propositions, the metaphilosophical 
characterization of philosophy as a constructive enterprise similarly stresses the 
importance of paradigmatic concepts, consensus, and the collaborative aggregation of 
effort in order for ‘progress’ to occur. Wittgenstein powerfully illustrated such a 
conception, not only of constructive philosophy, but also of normal science or any other 
constructive school of thought (2001, §6.341, pp. 81–2, emphasis added): 
 
Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then say that 
whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as closely as I 
wish to the description of it by covering the surface with sufficiently fine square 
mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way I 
shall have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. … The 
different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world. 
Mechanics [for instance] determines one form of description of the world by 
saying that all propositions used in the description of the world must be 
obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions – the axioms of 
mechanics. It thus supplies bricks for building the edifice of science, and it says, 
‘Any building that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be 
constructed with these bricks, and with these alone.’ 
 
Thus it is claimed that the rigidity and conventionality of theoretical frameworks 
provide scope for interpreting the world in different ways. The choice of framework is 
more arbitrary than one might commonly suppose, and although they may contradict 
one another to various degrees, each nonetheless brings something worthwhile to the 
table.13 Analogously then, the communitarian’s bedrock propositions can be seen to 
form a function similar to the axiomatic ‘bricks’ Wittgenstein describes. If a student is 
taught English, Japanese or Gaelic, they shall be introduced to different words and 
grammars (replete with their own unique ‘worlds’14). Yet common to any particular 
language is the emergence of meaning, communication, and so language generally. 
Communitarians and the metaphilosophical prescription to constructive philosophy 
share an emphasis both on common, bedrock concepts, and the subsequent, 
collaborative development of relatively rigid frameworks. 
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Ironically it is Wittgenstein – the paradigmatic communitarian – who also gives voice 
to the parallel shared between the interpersonalistic philosophy of language and 
philosophy regarded as a revolutionary process (1999, p. 214): ‘You have a new 
conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. …What you have primarily 
discovered is a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way of 
painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song.’ Such a metaphilosophical 
characterization seems to accord well with the potential freedom that the 
interpersonalist stresses is borne by each and every word, concept and proposition. As 
Jacques Derrida puts it (elsewhere tying it not only to the illusory a-historicism of 
philosophy, but to all experience whatsoever) (1988, p. 12): ‘Every sign, linguistic or 
nonlinguistic, spoken or written … in a small or large unit, can be cited, put in between 
quotation marks; in doing so it can break with every given context, engendering an 
infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable.’15 In this light, just 
as the interpersonalist denies that the meaning of any particular word, sign, or concept 
can be either absolutely fixed or directly communicated, it can be said that philosophy 
considered as a revolutionary process similarly sees any pre-existing school of thought 
and their lynchpin concepts as ever prone to radical reconception. Indeed, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty writes in such a vein about the phenomenology of the innately 
revolutionary hermeneutics of philosophical study (1966, pp. 178):  ‘People can speak 
to us only in a language which we already understand, each word of a difficult 
[philosophical] text awakens in us thoughts which were ours beforehand, but these 
meanings sometimes combine to form new thoughts which recast them all, and we are 
transported to the heart of the matter, we find the source.’16 Philosophy as a 
revolutionary process is thus seen to share a curious parallel with the interpersonalist’s 
insistence that, despite the typically successful inculcation of certain communally 
shared words, phrases and propositions via the process of ostensive learning, there will 
always remain space open for a difference in and so, a radical reconceptualization of 
meaning and understanding. 
 
 
3. Conclusion: Scientific Philosophy? 
 
The aim thus far has been neither to endorse nor refute either or both metaphilosophical 
viewpoints. Rather, it was to establish that they do indeed exist; that despite being 
seemingly antithetical to one another, they are equally prevalent metaphilosophies; to 
give some limited expression to what each position entails; and to point out the 
apparent similarities that the two share with positions held within the philosophy of 
language. Of this lattermost undertaking, it is hoped that some further light will have 
been shed on the supposed natures of their respective metaphilosophical counterparts. It 
would certainly go too far to suggest that the parallels themselves are sufficient to 
demonstrate that the cause of the metaphilosophical divergence has its roots in the 
primitive nature of language. For one thing, the once all-encompassing influence of the 
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linguistic turn has begun to fall out of favor in recent years, such that it is no longer 
widely held that the key to philosophy lies in better understanding language (though 
equally, no one doubts that such understanding will nonetheless be of benefit) (see for 
instance, Williamson, 2008). In this light, one might perhaps suspect that the dual 
metaphilosophies investigated herein might therefore need to be reevaluated for the 
seemingly inherent linguistic predilections. Perhaps – but again, here is not the place to 
attempt such determinations. Rather, in this third and final section the aim is solely to 
consider in light of what has gone before, whether it is likely that philosophy will one 
day become a science. To do so, we will consider, without condoning or refuting either 
metaphilosophical viewpoint, the likelihood of philosophy becoming a science were 
either or both true and accurate accounts of the discipline’s nature. 
 
If philosophy is indeed a constructive and collaborative enterprise that seeks increased 
rigor and consensus then it seems hopeful that it may one day become a science. Some 
of the work in considering this hypothetical has already been undertaken at the close of 
§1.2, but it will serve us well to here reconsider the matter more directly. That is to say, 
if philosophy has its own unique questions and areas of concern, then it would seem 
that the discipline of philosophy is to be defined by those set of issues. Further, if 
philosophy is only a constructive enterprise and its alleged revolutionary tendencies are 
either something of an aberration or a mischaracterization, then alone by what has been 
explored herein,17 there would seem to be no obvious obstacle preventing the 
possibility of philosophy one day coming to investigate its definitive questions in a 
manner that should be regarded as scientific. It would, however, appear redundant and 
so unlikely that the moniker ‘philosophy’ would subsequently be retained if this shift 
were to take place. This of course, isn’t to claim that such an issue-centric definition of 
constructive philosophy is unlikely to achieve scientific status, but it does appear to 
undercut the metaphilosophical force of what it means for philosophy as a discipline 
ever being a science. If, on the other hand, philosophy has no unique questions and 
areas of specialization, but is rather defined by being a particular approach and 
methodology, then clearly philosophy could not become scientific without radically 
altering those methodologies that presently define it. As to whether such a radical 
alteration might nonetheless see the emergence of a new, sufficiently scientific, yet 
distinctly philosophical methodology, nothing considered so far provides any real 
ground on which to speculate. It is therefore left as an open question. 
 
On the other side of the metaphilosophical divide, if it is the case that philosophy is 
essentially a revolutionary process, then it seems highly unlikely that it should ever be 
regarded as a science. Such a conclusion, of course, assumes something like a Kuhnian 
characterization of science defined as maintaining a certain degree of rigor and 
consensus. If we take such a characterization to be accurate of the essential distinction 
between the sciences and the non-sciences, then the comparatively idiosyncratic and 
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diffuse nature of revolutionary philosophies certainly precludes them from initially 
being regarded as sciences. 
 
The only remaining option to consider is that, despite the apparent antithetical nature of 
each respective metaphilosophical perspective, both in fact are accurate 
characterizations of the discipline of philosophy. If this is the case (as I personally 
suspect that it is), then it is again highly unlikely that philosophy will ever become a 
science. On this dualistic view, philosophy occupies an indeterminate position between 
aspiring towards consensus and rigor, and retaining the free, creative originality of the 
revolutionary process. In this light, philosophers are to be characterized by their 
tendency to seek out issues and schools of thought that are either in their fledgling 
stages of understanding, or in crisis and in need of substantial reconceptualization. 
Neither of these states, however, is commensurate with being labeled scientific. Of 
course, it may be pointed out (as it was earlier) that philosophers take themselves to be 
concerned not so much with the stamp of their discipline, but rather with the issues 
themselves. While this is certainly true, it would mean that if, for instance, Ethics were 
to one day become a scientific study, then although those gripped by ethical concerns 
would surely follow suit, they would simply be regarded as scientists and no longer as 
philosophers. Thus, regardless of how the metaphilosophical dualism canvassed herein 
is to be resolved, we have little to suppose that philosophy will become a science, at 
least not in any metaphilosophically meaningful sense of the phrase. 
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1 In order to avoid confusion, it is perhaps important to note one further aspect of Rorty’s own 
particular brand of metaphilosophy. That is, Rorty suggests a further distinction that he 
considers to be of greater significance than his original categorization. The division is between 
systematic and edifying philosophy. According to Rorty, systematic philosophies may be found 
within either the normal or revolutionary modes of philosophy, for systematic-revolutionary 
philosophers seek “the institutionalization of their own vocabulary” (p. 369), such that the 
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practice of systematic-normal philosophy can continue anew. Kant would be the exemplar here. 
Edifying philosophy alternatively commends itself only to the revolutionary mode. Indeed, it is 
of the very essence of edifying philosophy that it resist normalization. Rather than the 
development of arguments and analyses so typically definitive of philosophy, Rorty claims 
“great edifying philosophers are reactive and offer satires, parodies, aphorisms” (p. 369). Here 
he signals the later work of both Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger. This further 
division is, however, not included in the meta-metaphilosophical investigation herein. Firstly 
and definitively, Rorty’s categorization is not commonplace. Secondly and rather speculatively, 
it is believed the so-called edifying element in philosophy can be accounted for by the original 
division of constructive/revolutionary philosophies. Edifying philosophy that serves an 
exclusively polemic function can be said to adopt only the destructive element of revolutionary 
philosophy. Whereas edifying philosophies that actively resist all systemization, even of their 
own approach (e.g. ‘The tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao’ [Lao-Tzu, 2006]), can be 
straightforwardly characterized as revolutionary philosophy turned upon itself, without need for 
any further categorization. 
 
2 For any who feel that the various philosophies I cite would not be commensurable if taken in 
their entirety, notwithstanding the apology I have already made, let me invoke the wisdom of 
Nietzsche in my defense (1996, p. 261): ‘The Error of Philosophers. The philosopher believes 
that the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the building: posterity discovers it in the 
bricks with which he built and which are then often used again for better building: in the fact, 
that is to say that the building can be destroyed and nonetheless possess value as material.’  
 3 Further, related discussion takes place in Philosophy and Truth. Ed. Daniel Breazeale (Amherst; Prometheus Books, 1999) esp. pp. 50, 834 
 
4 There is a remarkable excerpt from a conversation between Wittgenstein and Turing, where 
the two talk past one another in each of their own well-honed idioms (see Hodges, 2000, pp. 
512–3). For further discussion of such phenomena, see Jeffrey Goodman, A Critical Discussion 
of Talking Past One Another (Philosophy and Rhetoric - Volume 40, Number 3, 2007, pp. 311–
25). 
 
5 Subsequently, while books such as Kahlil Gibran’s, The Prophet, and Robert M. Persig’s, Zen 
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, are often taken to be of a philosophical nature, they are 
not regarded as philosophy proper. 
 
6 i.e.: ‘Those unwilling or unable to accommodate their work [to a new paradigm of Science] 
must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to some other group. Historically, they have 
often simply stayed in the departments of philosophy from which so many of the special 
sciences have been spawned.’ 
 
7 i.e.: ‘Philosophy, of old the Queen of the Sciences, has come down a notch since her glory 
days. The rise of modern scientific methods, rather like a Cesarean section, has forced the birth 
of her independent children, the sciences, and one after another they have dropped from her 
generous womb: first physics, with it physiology, then chemistry, followed later by the social 
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and human sciences, psychology, economics, sociology, etc. Each in turn abandoned her as 
they attained to the peerage of departmental status within the academies.’ 
 
8 Strong philosophical quietism is not given any credence here, for to make the philosophical 
claim that philosophy has no legitimacy except to do away with itself it is taken to be self-
defeating. 
 
9 i.e.: ‘“What is an okapai?” is answered easily enough by an act of empirical observation. 
Similarly “What is the cube root of 729?” is settled by a piece of calculation in accordance with 
accepted rules. But if I ask “What is time?”, “What is a number?”, “What is the purpose of 
human life on earth?”, “How can I know past facts that are no longer there – no longer where?”, 
“Are all men truly brothers?”, how do I set about looking for the answer? ... The only common 
characteristic which all these questions appear to have is that they cannot be answered either by 
observation or calculation, either by inductive methods or deductive ... Such questions tend to 
be called philosophical.’ 
 
10 i.e.: ‘…in philosophy … in moral questions in so far as they are thought to be matters of truth 
and falsity, there has been notable failure to achieve an intellectual consensus about disputed 
question among the learned. Must we not then attach a peculiar authority to the discipline that 
can achieve a consensus [i.e. science]?’ 
 
11 i.e.: ‘Other creative fields display progress of the same sort [as science]. The theologian who 
articulates dogma or the philosopher who refutes the Kantian imperatives contributes to 
progress, if only to that of the group that shares his premises. No creative school recognizes a 
category of work that is, on the one hand, a creative success, but is not, on the other, an addition 
to the collective achievement of the group. If we doubt, as many do, that non-scientific fields 
make progress, that cannot be because individual schools make none. Rather, it must be 
because there are always competing schools, each of which constantly questions the very 
foundations of the others. The man who argues that philosophy, for example, has made no 
progress emphasizes that there are still Aristotelians, not that Aristotelianism has failed to 
progress.’ 
 
12 It should perhaps be noted that it is unclear whether Stroud counts himself as a 
communitarian in the sense outlined herein, or if the emphasis placed in this passage is 
somewhat misleading as to Stroud’s allegiances. Either way, the quotation clearly illustrates the 
general communitarian attitude, regardless. 
 
13  A similar sentiment I suspect was expressed by Aristotle when he writes of the various 
conceptions of happiness that preceded his own (1998, pp. 15–6): ‘For some identify happiness 
with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with 
these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include 
also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of 
old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be 
entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in 
most respects.’ 
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14 For a Hermeneutical account of how each particular language opens a unique world to its 
speakers, see Gadamer (2004), esp. pp. 436–52. 
 
15 Derrida continues: ‘This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the 
contrary that there are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring [ancrage]. This 
citiationality, this duplication or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is neither an accident nor 
an anomaly, it is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could not even have a function 
called “normal”.’ 
 
16 Merleau-Ponty continues: ‘Here there is nothing comparable to the solution of a problem, 
where we discover an unknown quantity through its relationship with known ones. For the 
problem can be solved only if it is determinate, that is, if the cross-checking of the data 
provides the unknown quantity with one or more definite values. In understanding others 
[philosophically], the problem is always indeterminate because only the solution will bring the 
data retrospectively to light as convergent, only the central theme of a philosophy, once 
understood, endows the philosopher’s writings with value of adequate signs. There is, then, a 
taking up of others’ thought through speech, a reflection in others, an ability to think according 
to others which enriches our own thoughts.’ 
 
17 Of course, there may be other reasons why the questions unique to philosophy cannot ever be 
treated scientifically. For an argument as to why philosophy of mind and language must 
fundamentally remain non-scientific, for instance, see Davidson 2001d, pp. 229–44. 
